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Tax treaties are often seen as a means to mitigate fierce tax competition. Building
on former literature, we challenge this view by arguing that taxes on passive income
reduce effective average tax rates; and induce neighbouring countries to react by
reducing bilateral tax rates. As opposed to traditional tax competition, where every
foreign investor would benefit from lower tax rates, we show that countries also
engage in cutting tax rates for investors from a particular country, leaving taxes for
everyone else unaffected. We call this bilateral tax competition, and we test these
predictions empirically. We focus on the four treaty withholding tax rates on passive
income - portfolio dividends, participation dividends, interest, and royalties - and
collect these rates for 3,000 tax treaties and amending protocols signed between 1930
and 2012. We find a positive relationship in the negotiated withholding tax rates
of a destination country’s tax treaty and destination country’s competitors’ past
tax treaties with the same source country. This relationship is strongest for the tax
rates on interest and royalties.
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1. Introduction
The practice of countries signing double tax treaties (DTTs) goes back a long
way in history. Already in 1899, Prussia and Austria-Hungary entered into the
first ever double tax treaty. Although the economic consequences of DTTs remain
inconclusive (Blonigen and Davies, 2004; Egger et al., 2006; Neumayer, 2007;
Petkova, Stasio and Zagler, 2019), the number of countries entering into DTTs
continues to grow. While this trend can be characterised, at most, as a steady rise
in the first half of the century, the last two decades have seen a surge in the number
of concluded double taxation treaties. Nevertheless, the empirical literature on
tax treaty formation is limited to just a few studies and leaves certain parts of the
international tax treaty policy unexplored. This paper fills this void by studying
spillovers in tax treaty formation.
Tax treaties are often seen as a means to mitigate fierce tax competition. We
challenge this view by demonstrating in an analytical framework how withholding
taxes on passive income reduce effective average tax rates between two countries;
and how this will induce a reaction of competing countries, who in turn will reduce
their withholding tax rates. Next, we test these theoretical predictions empiri-
cally. We focus on the four distinct treaty withholding tax rates on passive income
- portfolio dividends, participation dividends, interest, and royalties - and collect
these rates for nearly 3,000 tax treaties and amending protocols signed between
1930 and 2012. We find a positive relationship in the negotiated withholding tax
rates of a destination country’s tax treaty and destination country’s competitor’s
past tax treaties with the same source country. This relationship is strongest for
the withholding tax rates on interest and on royalties. We show that this effect
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is strongest for developing countries, whereas the impact of existing treaties with
tax havens is surprisingly limited.
Traditionally, double tax treaties have been serving as an important policy tool
to promote international economic activity by preventing international double
taxation. However, over the years, DTTs have come to pursue additional goals
such as providing legal certainty, preventing tax discrimination in the state of
investment and exchange of information for tax matters. Most recently, DTTs
serve to mitigate tax avoidance practices and protect domestic tax base.
Against these different goals, Ligthart, Vlachaki and Voget (2011) empirically
study the determinants of DTT formation for a large sample of more than 17,000
country pairs covering the 1950 - 2006 period. Using a gravity framework, they
conclude that countries sign DTTs primarily to reduce international double tax-
ation and, to a lesser extent, to provide a legal instrument for the exchange of
information in tax matters. In support of this finding, Davies (2003), argues that
the main role of DTCs lies in the harmonisation and the lowering of withholding
tax rates on international capital income. OECD countries are encouraged to
conclude a double tax convention for limiting the exercise of taxing powers by the
destination state. Reciprocity in flows of income and capital is expected to level
out any potential loss of taxing powers between such states.
Yet, many researchers argue that double taxation will often be prevented uni-
laterally (Rixen and Schwarz, 2009; Petkova, Stasio and Zagler, 2019). Moreover,
with an asymmetric investment position, the lowering of withholding tax rates in
treaties using the ordinary credit method leads to a revenue transfer from the net
capital importer to the net capital exporter (Rixen and Schwarz, 2009).
Chisik and Davies (2004) discuss how these distributional implications can affect
withholding taxes in the framework of tax treaty bargaining. They predict that
more asymmetric countries will conclude treaties with higher withholding tax
rates. This theory is then tested using data on U.S. and OECD bilateral tax
treaties, and the results broadly support their predictions. Rixen and Schwarz
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(2009) confirm this finding using data on German tax treaties and show that these
conclusions also hold for the definition of permanent establishment measured as
the minimum number of months necessary to qualify as a “construction permanent
establishment”.
To our knowledge, Barthel and Neumayer (2012) are the only authors to analyse
spatial diffusion in tax treaty formation. They show that the probability of two
countries entering into a DTT increases with specific source and target contagion.
In other words, the likelihood of two countries signing a tax treaty raises with
the source country’s peers having a tax treaty with a given target (destination)
country and, conversely, target (destination) country’s peers having a tax treaty
with the specific source country. These results are robust to specifying the spatial
weight matrix as common region, export market similarity and export product
similarity.
However, little is known about tax treaty bargaining in a global network of
tax treaties. At the same time, recent studies by van‘t Riet and Lejour (2018),
Hong (2018) and Petkova, Stasio and Zagler (2019) underscore the importance
of considering tax treaties not merely as bilateral, but rather as part of a global
network. Whereas the first two papers show that the international FDI flows can
be partially explained by countries’ position in the tax treaty network, the last
one argues that the impact of DTTs on FDI depends on their relevance vis-a´-vis
the domestic law of the signatory states and all other treaties in the network.
This paper fills this void by studying tax treaty bargaining in a global network
of tax treaties.
We build on the work of Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003) and show in a theo-
retical framework (see Appendix 1) how withholding tax rates on passive income
attribute to lower average effective tax rates. Next, we derive countries’ best reac-
tion functions and show a positive relationship between the withholding tax rates
concluded between a given source and destination state, and between destination
country’s peers and the same source state. We then test these predictions empir-
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ically extending the spatial diffusion framework of Barthel and Neumayer (2012).
We focus on the four treaty withholding tax rates on passive income - portfo-
lio dividends, participation dividends, interest, and royalties and find a positive
relationship in the negotiated withholding tax rates of a destination country’s
tax treaty and destination country’s competitor’s past tax treaties with the same
source country.
This relationship is strongest for the withholding tax rates on interest and
on royalties. Moreover, our results are robust to interdependence in tax treaty
rates; unobservable treaty characteristics; source-country, destination-country,
year; source- and destination-region-year fixed effects; sample selection and model
specifications testing for alternative definitions of our key explanatory variable.
In extensions of our main analysis, we analyse the differential effects among
three groups of countries, i.e. OECD members, developing countries, and tax
havens. We note that the effect is strongest for destination countries that are
developing countries, whereas existing treaties with tax havens matter little.
Our paper contributes to various strands of research. First, we advance the lit-
erature on treaty formation by studying tax treaty bargaining in a global network
of tax treaties. Second, we show that spillover effects in international taxation
go beyond treaty shopping and profit shifting, and extend to tax treaty policy as
such. Finally, we contribute to the broad literature on the political economy of
international institutions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarises
the existing literature and motivates our hypothesis. Section 3 discusses our
sample and empirical methodology. We present our main results in section 4,
extensions in section 5 and several robustness tests in section 6. The paper
concludes discussing its policy implications in section 7. A formal model for our
hypothesis is derived in Appendix 1.
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2. Bilateral tax competition and tax treaty formation
The canonical models of tax competition are those of Wilson (1986) and Zodrow
and Mieszkowski (1986) that consider small open economies with strategic inter-
action. However, as the countries decide on the tax rate on a fully mobile factor
and capital is perfectly mobile, a race-to-the-bottom occurs and the tax rate goes
down to zero. These models can be seen as a game similar to a Bertrand compe-
tition with a high number of countries, whose results correspond to the perfect
competition case. In contrast, Wildasin (1988) and Hoyt (1991) concentrate only
on a small number of countries, and find that this leads to a higher tax in setting
the rates, as they now have a bigger market power.
More recent literature has been able to find evidence for corporate tax competi-
tion and strategic interactions between tax rates (see Egger, Pfaffermayr and Win-
ner (2007), Davies and Voget (2008), Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2008)
and Redoano (2012)). Many papers also identify a positively sloped tax reaction
function in the rate setting. Using OECD data from 1982 to 1999, Davies, Egger
and Egger (2010) develop a model in which firms simultaneously allocate capital
depending on the effective marginal tax rate and profit depending on the statu-
tory tax rate. The authors find evidence of strategic behaviour in the statutory
rates.
Further, a positive reaction function for personal and corporate income tax rates
is found also in the paper by Egger, Pfaffermayr and Winner (2007). Heinemann,
Overesch and Rincke (2010) focus not only on the tax rate cutting decisions but
also on the fact how these are affected by the tax rates in neighbouring countries.
The authors consider 32 European countries, and find that a country is more
likely to decrease its corporate tax rate if its own rate is high, while the one by
its neighbours is low.
We extend this literature by considering tax competition in destination coun-
tries’ taxes on corporate income, in particular withholding tax rates on passive
income. In a theoretical framework - presented in the Appendix - we resort to the
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seminal model of Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003) to indicate how countries can
manage the effective average tax rate (EATR) through their withholding taxes.
Next, we derive destination countries’ tax reaction function in the same fashion
as Davies and Voget (2008) and show that withholding tax rates on passive in-
come are indeed strategic complements. This predicts a positive peer effect in the
empirical part of our analysis, as measured by the peer rate variable.
Building on these theoretical predictions, our paper makes a novel contribution.
Traditional tax competition literature posits the idea that countries underbid each
others corporate income tax rates in order to attract mobile capital. This is a
rather crude measure, as it also reduces corporate income tax rates for investors
that already see higher tax rates at home, thus giving them a windfall profit.
In contrast, this paper shows empirically that countries (also) engage in a more
subtle form of tax competition. Destination countries employ double tax treaties
to bilaterally reduce tax rates for foreign investors from a specific source country,
leaving tax rates with respect to all other source countries untouched - a policy
which we label bilateral tax competition.
3. Data and empirical methodology
Having derived the slope of destination country’s reaction function theoretically
(in Appendix 1), we test these predictions empirically focusing on the four distinct
treaty withholding tax rates on passive income - portfolio dividends, participation
dividends, interest, and royalties. We collect these rates for nearly 3,000 tax
treaties and amending protocols signed between 1930 and 2012. We assume a
100% owned subsidiary for the rate on participations dividends and collect interest
rates commonly applied on inter-company loans and rates applicable to patent
royalties, as to ensure comparability between observations. We collect data on
treaties signed, terminated and renegotiated during our time sample. In this way,
our key explanatory variable will include the withholding tax rates negotiated
between the source country and other destination countries that are in force at
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the signature of the observed tax treaty.
We do not make any prior assumptions about the direction of the source-
destination relationship of the two signatory countries. While rare, the treaty
signatories can negotiate asymmetric withholding tax rates, each responding to
their own peers’ rates with the intended treaty partner. This is the reason every
treaty appears twice in our sample, both between source country A and destina-
tion country B, as well as between source country B and destination country A.
As we are interested in withholding tax rates applied to the repatriation of profits
from the source to the destination country, we will only consider competing desti-
nation countries’ withholding tax rates. Thus we collect and analyse withholding
tax rates for every pair ij and ji.1
All of our control variables, including GDP and GDP per capita, as well as
the measure of contiguity used to construct the spatial weights matrix in one
of the robustness tests come from CEPII (Head, Mayer and Ries, 2010). We
construct the indicators of common intermediate and sub-geographical regions in
accordance with the most recent UN M49 standard. We estimate a pooled cross
section across all years in our sample in the following form:
(1) WHTij,t,k = α+ ρωjΩim,t−n + βXi,j,t + γDij,t + θi + φj + ηt + υit + ωjt + 
where WHTij,t,k is the negotiated withholding tax rate of type k between source
country i and destination country j in year of treaty conclusion t. ωjΩim,t−n
indicates our key explanatory variable, peer rate. We construct the peer rate
variable by interacting the spatial weight matrix of destination country j with
the withholding tax rates matrix between source country i and all other potential
destination countries m 6= j, n years before treaty year t. We take this interaction
term n years before treaty conclusion, i.e. before the withholding tax rate of type k
1Barthel and Neumayer (2012) discuss the distinction between directed and undirected dyads. Even
though we do not model our dyads as directed, we effectively treat them as such, with the peer rate
variable in this paper corresponding to the specific target contagion variable in Barthel and Neumayer
(2012).
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between source country i and destination country j is being observed, to mitigate
the reverse causality between the dependent variable and our key explanatory
variable. Past rates can affect the yet to be negotiated ones, but current and
future rates do not affect the already signed ones. Hence, we can estimate our
model by OLS and there is no need to resort to ML.
Continuing with model description, Xi,t−n is a vector of control variables cap-
turing the bargaining position of source and destination state, especially GDP,
GDP per capita and a proxy for both countries’ treaty policy. Dij,t is a vec-
tor of variables characterising the bilateral relationship between source country i
and destination country j; θi and φj are source, respectively destination-country
fixed effects; ηt is a vector of year dummies; υit and ωjt are source-region-year,
respectively destination-region-year fixed effects; and  is the error term.2
We define two countries to be spatially connected if they share the same geo-
graphical region at the intermediate level according to the UN M49 standard.3
Throughout all of the main results, we estimate our model defining the time lag
of the peer rate variable with n = 2. In our robustness tests, we replicate our
analysis also with different values of the time lag.
For the proxy for each of the source and destination country tax treaty policy,
we use an average withholding tax rate of type k across all previously existing tax
treaties of the source and destination country. In this way, our peer rate variable
measures destination country’s response to withholding tax rates negotiated by
its peers, conditional on its preferred withholding tax rate. In other words, our
key explanatory variable will measure the effect driven by the spatial dimension.4
2We construct the source-region-year and destination-region year fixed effects at the same regional
level as the peer rate variable, i.e. intermediate regions. While we acknowledge that source- and
destination-year fixed effects would be more desirable, many countries do not conclude more than a
single tax treaty in a given year. Thus, country-year fixed effects would take away most of the variation
in our dataset.
3Intermediate geographical regions are one level above geographical contiguity. Our findings hold
also for spatial weight matrixes based on contiguity or sub-global level - one level above intermediate
geographical regions.
4Ideally, we would like to proxy for source and destination country preferred withholding tax rate
through the withholding tax rates levied under both countries’ domestic law. Unfortunately, we can
obtain these data in a structured format only as of 2005, thereby severely limiting the time span and
number of observations in our analysis. In light of these considerations, we decided to proxy for source and
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4. Main results
We estimate our model using only control variables in Table 1. This will serve
as a benchmark for the estimations including our key variable of interest. We find
that the unweighted average rates across all former treaties signed by source and
destination countries is a good predictor for the negotiated withholding tax rates
on interest and royalties. The negative coefficients on the source and destination
country GDP per capita in the case of withholding tax rates on participations
dividends (Column (2)) and royalties (Column (4)) suggest that wealthier coun-
tries tend to negotiate lower rates. However, the magnitude of these effect is not
large.
We present the full model in Table 2 including all of our control variables and
both the unweighted country average withholding tax rates as well as our key ex-
planatory variable. The peer rate variable is statistically significant and positive
for each type of the withholding tax rate, with the peer rate on interest and royal-
ties continuously showing significance at the 1% level. While the source-country’s
average tax rate is no longer significant for any of the four types of withholding
tax rates, the destination country’s average tax rate is statistically significant and
positive for all rates excluding portfolio dividends. Thus, destination countries’
tax treaty policy - as proxied by the average withholding tax rate across all of
their previously concluded tax treaties - is a relevant determinant of future nego-
tiations about withholding tax rates. Destination countries that achieved higher
withholding tax rates in the past, will continue to negotiate higher withholding
tax rates. Furthermore, we continue to observe that the negotiated withholding
tax rates increase with destination country’s GDP, but decrease with its GDP
per capita in the case of royalties.
We interpret these results as indicating tax competition in negotiated withhold-
ing tax rates on passive income. Destination countries react to other countries’
destination countries’ treaty policy through their past average rates and trace bilateral tax competition
over a long period of time.
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past tax treaties with the same treaty partner by negotiating lower withholding
tax rates with the aim of attracting source-country’s mobile capital. This effect
goes beyond destination-country’s treaty policy and is driven by a geographical
dimension. A different - though not exclusive - interpretation of these results is
that past tax treaties impose a downward pressure on future tax treaties’ with-
holding tax rates. This spillover effect clearly limits the scope for destination
countries’ individual treaty policy. This results is statistically robust in the pres-
ence of a rich set of fixed effects, including source- and destination-country fixed
effects; year fixed effects; and source-region-year and destination-region-year fixed
effects.
We continue the analysis addressing the possible interdependence between tax
treaties’ withholding tax rates. It cannot be excluded that when countries negoti-
ate a double taxation agreement, they agree on a set of withholding rates, rather
than on each of them individually. To explore this possibility, we replace the four
distinct types of withholding tax rates with their average in Table 3, Column (1);
and with the minimum of the four rates in Table 3, Column (2).5 We find results
that are in line with the main results presented in Table 2. In both cases, the
peer rate is highly significant at the 1% level. Yet, the magnitude of the peer
rate is on the lower bound and closer to that of portfolio and participation div-
idends if we use average withholding tax rates (column 1). Meanwhile the peer
rate approaches the average between the lower bound estimates and higher bound
estimates (interest and royalties) when using the minimum withholding tax rate
(column 2).
Throughout the main analysis, we assume taxation of participation dividends
at the treaty-rate of portfolio dividends, if the former is not negotiated. In Table
3, Column (3) we limit the analysis only to tax treaties that include a negotiated
withholding tax rate on participation dividends. The results are statistically
5Note that average peer rate across the four separate withholding tax rates is different from the
source- and destination-country average rates across all of their treaties, but for each type of withholding
tax rate separately.
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significant, albeit only at the 10% significance level. However, we note that the
sample size drops more than half.
Finally, it is not only possible that countries negotiate a set of withholding tax
rates, but negotiate their tax rates conditional on other provisions included in the
tax treaty. For instance, destination countries may negotiate more aggressively
if the tax treaty includes strong provisions on exchange of information for tax
purposes and mutual assistance in tax matters. While limiting the withholding
tax rates, such a treaty could potentially increase destination-countries tax base
to profits that would otherwise escape taxation. Since accurate data on other
treaty characteristics is not possible at this scale, we choose a different approach.
We pool the four separate withholding tax rates on passive income into a single
sample. In doing so, our sample includes now four observations per tax treaty,
which allows us to add to our analysis a tax treaty fixed effect. This fixed ef-
fect will control for any unobserved heterogeneity in tax treaty characteristics,
including the presence, scope and strength of individual provisions; as well as any
country-year characteristics. We further adapt our model by including dummies
for observations of participation dividends, interest and royalties, and interaction
terms between each of them and the peer rate variable. Thus we are able to see
the differential effect compared to portfolio dividends.
We note several interesting results. First, the dummies for participation divi-
dends, interest and royalties, are all statistically significant at the 1% level and
negative indicating that these rates tend to be lower than the withholding tax
rates on portfolio dividends. This effect is strongest for participation dividends
and interest rates. Second, the peer rate variable is still highly significant and
positive pointing to statistically robust tax competition in negotiated withhold-
ing tax rates on passive income. Interestingly, the interaction terms suggest that
there is no additional effect on participation dividends. In contrast, we observe a
strong differential effect in the case of interest and royalties, with the sign of the
interaction terms suggesting fiercer tax competition on those rates. These results
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3567791
are in line with the higher magnitude of the peer rate variable in the case of inter-
est and royalties withholding tax rates in Table 2. Finally, we note that both the
source and destination-country average rate across all of their former treaties are
now highly significant and much larger in magnitude than before. We interpret
these findings as indicating that individual countries’ treaty policy extends to all
treaty aspects and countries negotiate their rates conditional on achieving other
treaty policy goals.
5. Extensions
We extend our main analysis in three directions. First, we investigate the
position of three distinct groups of countries in tax competition on negotiated
withholding tax rates on passive income, namely: OECD countries, developing
countries and tax havens. Second, we analyse the network effect of source and
destination countries having signed tax treaties with tax havens in their treaty
networks, thus other than the observed tax treaty. Third, we allow the spillover
effect from past treaties to vary with their age.
We add to our main model dummy variables taking the value of unity for
OECD source-country, OECD destination-country, and OECD country-pair in
Table 4, Columns (1) to (4), and also their individual interaction terms with
the peer rate variable in Columns (5) to (8). We note, somehow surprisingly,
that destination countries, including OECD members, negotiate higher rates on
participation dividends if the source country is an OECD member. This could
be either due to the generosity of OECD countries, or because these DTTs are
typically older and therefore exhibit higher rates.6 In contrast, OECD country-
pairs agree on lower withholding tax rates on royalties. Once we account for the
different interaction terms, the results suggest that OECD countries tend to both
negotiate lower withholding tax rates portfolio dividends, interest and royalties;
6For example, a closer look at the dataset reveals several cases of primarily Scandinavian countries
agreeing on higher destination country withholding tax rates (especially if the destination country is a
less developed one), while unilaterally lowering their own withholding tax rates.
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and drive destination-country tax competition, except for withholding tax rates
on royalties, where the average effect of peer rate is still significant.
We repeat this exercise for developing countries instead of OECD members in
Table 5. We define countries as developing if they are not in the upper-middle
or high-income groups according to the World Bank. Destination countries tend
to conclude higher withholding tax rates on interest and royalties income when
the source country is a developing one. However, when both the source and the
destination state is a developing country, the negotiated withholding tax rates
are lower on portfolio dividends, interest and royalties. Nevertheless, we stress
that the magnitude of these effects is small. Somehow surprisingly, the interaction
terms point to a fiercer tax competition if the source state is a developing country.
More interestingly, we observe a strong differential effect in the case withholding
tax rates on interest and royalties whenever the destination state is a developing
country.
In contrast to the previous two tables, we see little impact of tax havens in Table
6. Neither the dummy for tax haven pairs (note that source and destination tax
haven dummies are both absorbed by the fixed effects), nor the interaction terms
suggest any differential effect of tax havens countries. The noticeable exception
is the strong result on withholding tax rates on interest income when both source
and destination state are tax havens.
We account for all three groups of countries in Table 7. In particular, we extend
the main model with dummies for OECD destination, source states and pairs;
developing destination and source countries and pairs; tax haven pairs; and their
interaction terms of the peer rate. In a nutshell, we note that tax competition
in negotiated withholding tax rates is primarily driven by OECD country-pairs
(in the case of interest and royalties); and destination states that are developing
countries (all types of passive income except participation dividends). In contrast,
tax havens matter little, except for withholding tax rates on interest income when
both states are classified as tax havens.
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Our second set of extensions focuses of the network effect of source and desti-
nation countries having signed tax treaties with tax havens in its treaty network.
We add two dummies to our model taking the value of unity if the source state,
respectively the destination state, have concluded a treaty with any tax haven
prior to concluding the observed treaty with a given source state in Table 8,
Columns (1) to (4) and their interaction terms with the peer rate in Columns
(5) to (8). We note the statistically significant and positive interaction terms on
the destination country in the case of interest and royalties and a statistically
significant, but negative coefficient on the destination country dummy for partic-
ipation dividends and royalties income. We interpret these results as suggesting
that destination countries that have concluded a treaty with a tax haven prior
to the observed treaty, are more aggressive, compete fiercer, and negotiate lower
withholding tax rates.
In Table 9, we replace the dummy with a variable indicating the numbering
of treaties concluded with tax havens in the source-, respectively destination-
country’s treaty network. The statistically significant results are now limited to
the withholding tax rates on interest and royalties income. We interpret these
results in twofold: in line with Table 8, the statistically significant results on
the destination country suggest that destination countries that have concluded a
treaty with a tax haven prior to the observed treaty, are more aggressive, compete
fiercer, and negotiate lower withholding tax rates. Moreover, source countries
with tax haven-treaties in their network induce fiercer competition for the conduit
capital flowing through these countries from the tax havens.
We conclude the second set of extensions by replacing the tax haven treaties
network variable, with the average withholding tax rate concluded by the source-
state, respectively the destination-state in their tax treaties with tax havens. The
results of the dummies and the interaction terms are again consistent. Destina-
tion countries that have higher (lower) negotiated withholding tax rates with
tax havens, negotiate higher (lower) withholding tax rates in their observed tax
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treaties. Simultaneously, the same destination countries compete much fiercer on
their negotiated withholding tax rates on portfolio dividends and interest income.
Our final extension of the main models allows the spillover effect from past
treaties to vary with their age. We speculate that more recent treaties concluded
by a given destination country’s geographical peers may be more relevant as a
benchmark to compete against than older tax treaties concluded by the same
peers. To this end, we adapt our empirical specification by weighting our peer
rate variable inversely by the number of years each of the past treaties has been
been in force in the signature year of the observed tax treaty. Table 11 presents
these results. While we do not notice many differences with the baseline results
presented in Table 2, the peer rate on both portfolio and participation dividends
is now statistically significant at the 1% level, and slightly higher in magnitude.
In contrast, the estimates on interest and royalties income are not slightly lower
in magnitude, whilst continue to be statistically significant at the 1% level.
6. Robustness tests
We perform a number of robustness tests in Tables 12 to 17 to ensure that our
results are not driven by the chosen value of the time lag and are independent
of the geographical level of the analysis. First, we alternate the time dimension
of the peer rate, taking the peer rate values 3, 4 or 5 years before the treaty
year t in Tables 12 to 14. We note that the peer rate on portfolio dividends
is no longer significant and that of participation dividends remains statistically
significant only for peer rate values lagged by 3 years. However, the results on
interest and royalties withholding tax rates remain significant across all tested
values of the time lag.
In Tables 15 and 16 we change the definition of spatially connected countries to
common sub-region (Table 15) and contiguity (Table 16).7 We find fairly identical
7Contiguity, defined as countries sharing a common border, is one geographical level below interme-
diate regions. Sub-regions are one geographical level above intermediate regions.
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estimates to our main results assuming common sub-regions in Table 15. The peer
rate variable is positive and statistically significant for each of the withholding
tax rate types. When we restrict the spatial dimension of the peer rate only
to neighbouring countries in Table 16, the peer rate is no longer significant in
the case of portfolio and participation dividends. We continue to observe strong
correlation between the peer rate and the negotiated withholding tax rates in the
case of interest and royalties.
In Table 17, we address another concern. Since negotiated withholding tax
rates are observable only for country-pairs with a signed tax treaty, our sample
is subject to sample selection. We verify that this restriction does not bias our
results by estimating the Heckman sample selection model. We construct the
first stage sample by including all country-pairs with a tax treaty in its year of
signature, and for the remaining country pairs the observation for the final year in
our sample, i.e. 2012. In this way, we allow countries maximum time to conclude
a double taxation agreement. For country pairs with multiple tax treaties, we
keep only the most recent one. We satisfy the exclusion restriction by including
common language as predictor of tax treaty formation in the first stage, but not
as of negotiating withholding tax rates.8 Once we control for sample selection, we
observe highly significant and positive correlations between peer rate variable and
each of the withholding tax rates. Thus, we are confident that our main results
are not driven by sample selection.
Finally, we construct placebo peer rates assigning countries a random interme-
diate region and thereby changing its peers.9 We take 200 random draws and
show in Figure 1 the distribution of the t-statistics of the placebo peer rates for
each of the withholding tax rates across all 200 random draws. We find that the
8Ligthart, Vlachaki and Voget (2011) show that common language is a strong predictor of two coun-
tries signing a tax treaty. We verify that common language does not influence negotiated withholding
tax rates by including this variable as an additional regressor in our main model. Indeed, we find no
correlation with our dependent variable - results available upon request.
9Since our main results hold using a spatial lag defining similarity at the sub region - see also Table
15 - we condition the random draw on countries being assigned an intermediate region within different
world regions that are methodologically equivalent to continents.
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peer rate variable is statistically significant in less than 5% of the draws (10% in
the case of peer rate on interest withholding tax rate). The number of statisti-
cally significant, negative peer rates varies around 10% for each of the types, with
the number of insignificant peer rates being more than 80% for all but interest
withholding tax rates. Moreover, we note that none of the draws results in all
four peer rate estimates to be individually statistically significant at the same
time.10 With these results, we are confident that our main results are unique to
the real-world distribution of countries across the globe.
7. Conclusions
It has long been established that countries engage in tax competition for in-
ternationally mobile capital by setting their corporate income tax rates below
their competitors (Wilson, 1986; Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986). This paper
argues that countries also engage in bilateral tax competition by reducing total
repatriation taxes on profits for investors from a particular (source) country of
residence, holding all other total repatriation taxes unchanged. We have called
this phenomenon bilateral tax competition.
This paper gives ample empirical evidence for the existence of bilateral tax com-
petition. We look at the evolution of withholding tax rates on dividends, interest
and royalties (the bilateral component of total repatriation taxes) contained in
approximately 3000 double tax treaties signed since 1930. We find - in line with
the standard tax competition literature - that withholding tax rates have fallen
over time, as previous reductions in withholding tax rates of a country lead to
further reductions in new or amended double tax treaties of that country.
More importantly, this paper also demonstrates bilateral tax competition, as
countries will further reduce their withholding tax rates if their peers (or com-
petitors) have reduced their withholding tax rates previously. Surprisingly, the
strongest effects are not measured from tax havens, and not even among OECD
10Results available upon request.
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Figure 1: T-statistics placebo peer rates
Note: Distribution of t-statistics of 200 placebo peer rates indicated by bars. Normal distribution
indicated by solid curve. The 5% significance level cut-off points and estimation sample t-statistics
indicated by dashed, respectively solid, vertical lines.
countries - who otherwise maintain that competition is a force for the good -
but rather between developing countries, who apparently compete fiercely over
scarce global investment capital. Double tax treaties are not a means to eliminate
double taxation, but rather an instrument of bilateral tax competition, which is
avidly used around the world.
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Appendix I
Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003) define EATR for an international invest-
ment as:
(2) Tl =
R∗l −Rl
E(1 + ψl)pl(1 + i)−1
where R∗l is the pre-tax economic rent; Rl is the net present value of the economic
rent generated by the perturbation of the subsidiary’s capital stock; E is the
expected exchange rate in period t+1; ψl is the expected inflation in location l; p
represents the financial return; and i is the nominal interest rate in the presence
of tax.
The net present value of the economic rent generated by the perturbation of the
subsidiary’s capital stock, Rl is defined as the sum of: (i) the rent attributable to
the investment in the subsidiary financed by the retained earnings (RREl ); (ii) the
additional cost of the parent raising external finance in the source county h (Fh);
and (iii) the additional cost of the subsidiary of raising finance from the parent
(Fl). Thus, the economic rent earned from an investment by the subsidiary is
given by:
(3) Rl = R
RE
l + Fh + Fl
where only RREl and Fl depend on cross-border taxes. From Eqs. (2) and (3) it
follows that:
(4) Tl =
R∗l −RREl − Fh − Fl
E(1 + ψl)pl(1 + i)−1
In accordance with Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003), we define finance from
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retained earnings as
RREl = −γ(1− σhl)(1−A)
+
γ(1− σhl)
(1 + ρ)
{E(1 + ψl)(pl + δ)(1− τl) + E(1 + ψl)(1− δ)(1−Al)}
(5)
where γ is a term measuring the tax discrimination between new equity and dis-
tributions; A is the new present value of tax allowances per unit of investment; ρ
is the ultimate shareholder’s nominal discount rate; δ is the economic depreciation
rate. Most importantly, σhl is the overall tax rate on dividend payments from the
subsidiary located in country l to the parent resident in country h, which in turn,
depends on the applicable withholding tax rate in the destination country l and
the applicable method of double tax relief in the source country of the parent h.
Fl depends on the source of subsidiary finance: retained earnings, new equity
and debt. In particular (with ϕ standing for tax depreciation),
(6) Fl(retained earnings) = 0
(7) Fl(new equity) =
γσhl
(1 + ρ)
(1− ϕlτl)[E − (1 + ρ)]
(8) Fl(debt) =
γ(1− ϕlτl)
(1 + ρ)
{σhl[E(1 + i(1− τl))− (1 + ρ)]− Eωhli}
Similarly to σhl, ωhli is the overall tax rate on interest payment from the subsidiary
to the parent that depends on the withholding tax rate in the country of the
subsidiary l and methods of double tax relief in the source country of the parent
h.
Assuming a constant exchange rate E, it can be shown that RREl and Fl both
decrease with the applicable withholding tax rate of the destination country l.
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Formally,
(9)
∂RREl
∂σhl
= − γ
(1 + ρ)
{E(1 +ψl)(pl + δ)(1− τl) +E(1 +ψl)(1− δ)(1−Al)} < 0
(10)
∂Fl(new equity)
∂σhl
=
γ
(1 + ρ)
(1− ϕlτl)[E − (1 + ρ)] < 0
(11)
∂Fl(debt)
∂ωhl
= −γEi(1− ϕlτl)
(1 + ρ)
< 0
Thus, a reduction in destination country’s l withholding tax rate on dividends
decreases its EATR on inbound foreign investments financed out of retained
earnings and new equity.11 A reduction in destination country’s l withholding
tax rate on interest payments decreases its EATR on inbound foreign investments
financed by debt. Moreover, as long as the personal taxes in the residence country
on capital gains are equal to or higher than the personal taxes in the residence
country on interest income, a reduction in destination country’s l withholding tax
rate on dividends decreases also the EATR of a subsidiary financed by debt.12
This implies a strategic complementarity of withholding tax rates. In other
words, destination countries can compete for inbound foreign investment by re-
11Note that when a tax treaty between destination country l and source country h is signed in period
t, it becomes effective only in period t + 1. Hence, the first term of Eq. (9) is not relevant for its
derivative. If we disregard the timing of the tax treaty, the theoretical predictions hold unambiguously
for a greenfield investment not financed out of retained earnings.
12Formally,
(12)
∂Fl(debt)
∂σhl
=
γ(1− ϕlτl)
(1 + ρ)
[E(1 + i(1− τl))− (1 + ρ)] < 0,
with
(13) ρ =
(1−mi)i
1− ζ ,
where mi is the residence country’s personal tax rate on interest income; and ζ is the residence country’s
personal tax rate on capital gains.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3567791
ducing their withholding tax rates.
Next, we want to see how the EATRs driven by a change in the withholding
tax rates affect the locational choices of countries. Following Davies and Voget
(2008), each firm locates in the region offering it the greatest equilibrium profits.
Similar to the derivation of the Logit estimator (see Green (2007)), the probability
that any given firm n locates in foreign location l among the set of possible foreign
locations K (denoted Ll) is:
(14) Ll =
exp[(1− Tl)Π˜l]
K∑
m=1
exp[(1− Tk)Π˜m]
,
with Π˜l and Π˜m standing for the equilibrium gross profits in countries l and m
respectively. Differentiating with respect to country’s l effective average tax rate
Tl and country’s m effective average tax rate Tm yields:
(15)
∂Ll
∂Tl
= (Ll − 1)PlΠ˜l < 0
(16)
∂Ll
∂Tk
= LlLkΠ˜k > 0
i.e. the probability of country l hosting firm n falls with its own effective average
tax rate Tl and increases with the other country k
′s effective average tax rate Tk.
Aggregating across the large number of firms implies that (in expected value)
the equilibrium number of firms that location l hosts is Ll and its tax revenues
are:
(17) TlLlNΠ˜l ,
where N is the total number of firms.
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Governments simultaneously choose tax rates in order to maximise their own
tax revenues. For country l, this yields an optimal value of tax:
(18) Tl = (1− Ll)−1Π˜−1l ,
where Ll depends on the tax rates of all countries m. From this, the best reaction
function for country l with respect to the tax rate of country k 6= l can be defined
as:
(19)
∂Tl
∂Tk
=
LlLkΠ˜k
(1− Ll)2Π˜l
> 0
which indicates that tax rates are strategic complements.
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Table 1: Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Port. Div. Part. Div. Interest Royalties
source avg -0.0782 -0.0627 0.137** 0.126**
(0.0652) (0.0590) (0.0535) (0.0501)
destination avg 0.0655 0.151** 0.147*** 0.169***
(0.0635) (0.0603) (0.0568) (0.0507)
LNgdp source -0.0151 0.0151 0.00650 0.0112
(0.0117) (0.00917) (0.00851) (0.00941)
LNgdp destination -0.00311 0.0241*** 0.00919 0.0122
(0.0117) (0.00884) (0.00850) (0.00940)
LNgdpcap source 0.00867 -0.0162* -0.00694 -0.0161*
(0.0115) (0.00880) (0.00827) (0.00926)
LNgdpcap destination 0.00297 -0.0208** -0.00982 -0.0170*
(0.0114) (0.00846) (0.00820) (0.00927)
Observations 4,336 4,404 4,396 4,493
R-squared 0.682 0.728 0.758 0.740
Source FE YES YES YES YES
Destination FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
SourceRegion*Year FE YES YES YES YES
DestinationRegion*Year FE YES YES YES YES
Note: Dependent variable: withholding tax rate on Portfolio Dividends (Column 1); Participation Div-
idends (Column 2); Interest (Column 3); and Royalties (Column 4). Robust standard errors clustered
by country pairs in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence
level.
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Table 2: Main Results - Pere Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Port. Div. Part. Div. Interest Royalties
peer rate 0.0476* 0.0513** 0.170*** 0.189***
(0.0252) (0.0240) (0.0252) (0.0251)
source avg -0.0394 -0.0567 0.123 0.124
(0.0928) (0.0878) (0.0885) (0.0782)
destination avg 0.0620 0.186** 0.187** 0.149**
(0.0804) (0.0786) (0.0735) (0.0607)
LNgdp source -0.00981 0.0154 0.0102 0.0126
(0.0154) (0.0117) (0.0107) (0.0131)
LNgdp destination -0.00171 0.0183* 0.00805 0.0251**
(0.0130) (0.00998) (0.00939) (0.0103)
LNgdpcap source -0.00269 -0.0176 -0.0135 -0.0209
(0.0150) (0.0111) (0.0103) (0.0128)
LNgdpcap destination 0.00168 -0.0132 -0.00794 -0.0275***
(0.0126) (0.00940) (0.00910) (0.0103)
Observations 3,060 3,114 3,111 3,213
R-squared 0.699 0.746 0.786 0.774
Source FE YES YES YES YES
Destination FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
SourceRegion*Year FE YES YES YES YES
DestinationRegion*Year FE YES YES YES YES
Note: Dependent variable: withholding tax rate on Portfolio Dividends (Column 1); Participation Div-
idends (Column 2); Interest (Column 3); and Royalties (Column 4). Robust standard errors clustered
by country pairs in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence
level.
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Table 3: Main Results - Withholding Tax Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average WHT Minimum WHT Reduced Part. Div. Treaty FE
peer rate 0.0578*** 0.109*** 0.0699* 0.102***
(0.0206) (0.0223) (0.0370) (0.0183)
part.div dum -0.0115***
(0.00221)
interest dum -0.0114***
(0.00259)
royalties dum -0.00716***
(0.00265)
peer rate*part.div dum 0.0130
(0.0164)
peer rate*interest dum 0.128***
(0.0202)
peer rate*royalties dum 0.104***
(0.0200)
source avg 0.0823 0.0217 0.133 0.380***
(0.0630) (0.0821) (0.169) (0.0215)
destination avg 0.0753 0.180** 0.240* 0.550***
(0.0570) (0.0740) (0.137) (0.0225)
LNgdp source 0.00347 0.00892 0.00574
(0.00835) (0.00934) (0.0201)
LNgdp destination 0.0143* 0.0185** 0.0360**
(0.00748) (0.00827) (0.0153)
LNgdpcap source -0.00973 -0.0159* -0.00337
(0.00816) (0.00918) (0.0183)
LNgdpcap destination -0.0137* -0.0204** -0.0281*
(0.00731) (0.00808) (0.0146)
Observations 3,275 3,275 1,362 14,402
R-squared 0.806 0.792 0.802 0.748
Source FE YES YES YES NO
Destination FE YES YES YES NO
Year FE YES YES YES NO
SourceRegion*Year FE YES YES YES NO
DestinationRegion*Year FE YES YES YES NO
Treaty FE NO NO NO YES
Note: Dependent variable: Average treaty withholding tax rate (Column 1); Minimum treaty withholding
tax rate (Column 2); Reduced withholding tax rate on Participation Dividends (Column 3); and Treaty
withholding tax rates (Column 4). Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs in parentheses.
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence level.
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Table 11: Extensions - Age-Weighted Peer Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Port. Div. Part. Div. Interest Royalties
peer rate 0.0787*** 0.0709*** 0.157*** 0.166***
(0.0238) (0.0231) (0.0245) (0.0225)
source avg -0.0619 -0.0662 0.119 0.134*
(0.0934) (0.0877) (0.0884) (0.0783)
destination avg 0.0617 0.184** 0.195*** 0.155**
(0.0802) (0.0783) (0.0734) (0.0606)
LNgdp source -0.0101 0.0143 0.00890 0.0126
(0.0154) (0.0117) (0.0107) (0.0131)
LNgdp destination -0.000605 0.0194* 0.00848 0.0250**
(0.0130) (0.00999) (0.00938) (0.0104)
LNgdpcap source -0.00240 -0.0166 -0.0120 -0.0209
(0.0150) (0.0110) (0.0103) (0.0129)
LNgdpcap destination 0.000419 -0.0143 -0.00846 -0.0279***
(0.0125) (0.00942) (0.00909) (0.0103)
Observations 3,060 3,114 3,111 3,213
R-squared 0.700 0.747 0.786 0.774
Source FE YES YES YES YES
Destination FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
SourceRegion*Year FE YES YES YES YES
DestinationRegion*Year FE YES YES YES YES
Note: Dependent variable: withholding tax rate on Portfolio Dividends (Column 1); Participation Div-
idends (Column 2); Interest (Column 3); and Royalties (Column 4). Robust standard errors clustered
by country pairs in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence
level.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3567791
Table 12: Robustness - Peer Rate n=3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Port. Div. Part. Div. Interest Royalties
peer rate 0.0205 0.0463* 0.177*** 0.187***
(0.0261) (0.0240) (0.0262) (0.0262)
source avg 0.0218 -0.113 -0.0117 0.0128
(0.0908) (0.0878) (0.0868) (0.0689)
destination avg 0.0296 0.148* 0.145* 0.103*
(0.0808) (0.0817) (0.0750) (0.0604)
LNgdp source -0.00863 0.0134 0.0140 0.0146
(0.0159) (0.0118) (0.0110) (0.0135)
LNgdp destination -0.00135 0.0222** 0.0105 0.0293***
(0.0139) (0.0108) (0.00995) (0.0106)
LNgdpcap source -0.00308 -0.0170 -0.0162 -0.0227*
(0.0154) (0.0111) (0.0106) (0.0133)
LNgdpcap destination 0.000824 -0.0180* -0.0114 -0.0339***
(0.0136) (0.0101) (0.00959) (0.0106)
Observations 2,841 2,902 2,883 2,983
R-squared 0.704 0.751 0.789 0.779
Source FE YES YES YES YES
Destination FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
SourceRegion*Year FE YES YES YES YES
DestinationRegion*Year FE YES YES YES YES
Note: Dependent variable: withholding tax rate on Portfolio Dividends (Column 1); Participation Div-
idends (Column 2); Interest (Column 3); and Royalties (Column 4). Robust standard errors clustered
by country pairs in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence
level.
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Table 13: Robustness - Peer Rate n=4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Port. Div. Part. Div. Interest Royalties
peer rate 0.0340 0.0271 0.162*** 0.156***
(0.0268) (0.0248) (0.0273) (0.0287)
source avg -0.0504 -0.121 -0.0278 0.0283
(0.0900) (0.0926) (0.0976) (0.0712)
destination avg -0.0808 0.110 0.0423 0.0589
(0.0798) (0.0793) (0.0751) (0.0587)
LNgdp source -0.0118 0.0107 0.0161 0.0216
(0.0173) (0.0125) (0.0119) (0.0142)
LNgdp destination 0.00347 0.0208* 0.0131 0.0317***
(0.0144) (0.0111) (0.0103) (0.0111)
LNgdpcap source -0.00157 -0.0145 -0.0189* -0.0292**
(0.0168) (0.0119) (0.0114) (0.0139)
LNgdpcap destination -0.00384 -0.0173 -0.0128 -0.0378***
(0.0140) (0.0106) (0.00981) (0.0110)
Observations 2,629 2,686 2,671 2,768
R-squared 0.714 0.761 0.797 0.782
Source FE YES YES YES YES
Destination FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
SourceRegion*Year FE YES YES YES YES
DestinationRegion*Year FE YES YES YES YES
Note: Dependent variable: withholding tax rate on Portfolio Dividends (Column 1); Participation Div-
idends (Column 2); Interest (Column 3); and Royalties (Column 4). Robust standard errors clustered
by country pairs in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence
level.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3567791
Table 14: Robustness - Peer Rate n=5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Port. Div. Part. Div. Interest Royalties
peer rate 0.0192 0.0372 0.176*** 0.146***
(0.0266) (0.0262) (0.0288) (0.0303)
source avg -0.0800 -0.0861 -0.116 -0.00299
(0.0868) (0.0904) (0.0945) (0.0741)
destination avg -0.00290 0.171** -0.0224 0.0834
(0.0778) (0.0805) (0.0826) (0.0647)
LNgdp source -0.0145 0.00970 0.0194 0.0232
(0.0177) (0.0130) (0.0122) (0.0147)
LNgdp destination -0.00136 0.0192* 0.0151 0.0330***
(0.0154) (0.0116) (0.0107) (0.0118)
LNgdpcap source 0.00117 -0.0113 -0.0213* -0.0287**
(0.0172) (0.0124) (0.0115) (0.0145)
LNgdpcap destination 0.00237 -0.0136 -0.0144 -0.0381***
(0.0151) (0.0109) (0.0101) (0.0117)
Observations 2,448 2,503 2,469 2,578
R-squared 0.711 0.764 0.792 0.779
Source FE YES YES YES YES
Destination FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
SourceRegion*Year FE YES YES YES YES
DestinationRegion*Year FE YES YES YES YES
Note: Dependent variable: withholding tax rate on Portfolio Dividends (Column 1); Participation Div-
idends (Column 2); Interest (Column 3); and Royalties (Column 4). Robust standard errors clustered
by country pairs in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence
level.
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Table 15: Robustness - Peer Rate Sub-Region
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Port. Div. Part. Div. Interest Royalties
peer rate 0.0571** 0.0510** 0.160*** 0.176***
(0.0250) (0.0236) (0.0243) (0.0242)
source avg -0.0243 -0.0590 0.103 0.141*
(0.0915) (0.0868) (0.0874) (0.0765)
destination avg 0.0261 0.183** 0.166** 0.134**
(0.0762) (0.0752) (0.0717) (0.0587)
LNgdp source -0.0107 0.0119 0.0101 0.0102
(0.0152) (0.0117) (0.0105) (0.0128)
LNgdp destination -0.00153 0.0173* 0.00911 0.0242**
(0.0129) (0.00985) (0.00939) (0.0102)
LNgdpcap source -0.000463 -0.0142 -0.0137 -0.0191
(0.0148) (0.0111) (0.0101) (0.0126)
LNgdpcap destination 0.00144 -0.0121 -0.00885 -0.0270***
(0.0125) (0.00927) (0.00911) (0.0102)
Observations 3,178 3,233 3,237 3,339
R-squared 0.701 0.748 0.789 0.773
Source FE YES YES YES YES
Destination FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
SourceRegion*Year FE YES YES YES YES
DestinationRegion*Year FE YES YES YES YES
Note: Dependent variable: withholding tax rate on Portfolio Dividends (Column 1); Participation Div-
idends (Column 2); Interest (Column 3); and Royalties (Column 4). Robust standard errors clustered
by country pairs in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence
level.
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Table 16: Robustness - Peer Rate Contiguity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Port. Div. Part. Div. Interest Royalties
peer rate 0.00462 0.0180 0.119*** 0.124***
(0.0235) (0.0213) (0.0258) (0.0255)
source avg -0.0517 0.0126 0.0930 0.0967
(0.100) (0.0926) (0.100) (0.0859)
destination avg 0.200** 0.221** 0.216** 0.105
(0.0980) (0.110) (0.0946) (0.0772)
LNgdp source -0.0112 0.0269** 0.0209 0.0251*
(0.0182) (0.0130) (0.0135) (0.0152)
LNgdp destination -0.0403** 0.0184 0.00823 0.0103
(0.0192) (0.0160) (0.0136) (0.0143)
LNgdpcap source 0.00480 -0.0253** -0.0193 -0.0285*
(0.0177) (0.0123) (0.0131) (0.0151)
LNgdpcap destination 0.0355* -0.0154 -0.0120 -0.0250*
(0.0191) (0.0151) (0.0133) (0.0145)
Observations 2,359 2,403 2,370 2,423
R-squared 0.693 0.764 0.789 0.788
Source FE YES YES YES YES
Destination FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
SourceRegion*Year FE YES YES YES YES
DestinationRegion*Year FE YES YES YES YES
Note: Dependent variable: withholding tax rate on Portfolio Dividends (Column 1); Participation Div-
idends (Column 2); Interest (Column 3); and Royalties (Column 4). Robust standard errors clustered
by country pairs in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence
level.
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